This is the fifth in a series of posts that introduce new libraries for a pure OCaml implementation of TLS. You might like to begin with the introduction.
ocaml-tls is the new, clean-slate implementation of TLS in OCaml that we've been working on for the past six months. In this post we try to document some of its internal design, the reasons for the decisions we made, and the current security status of that work. Try our live interactive demonstration server which visualises TLS sessions.
The OCaml-TLS architecture
The OCaml ecosystem has several distinct ways of interacting with the outside world (and the network in particular): straightforward unix interfaces and the asynchronous programming libraries lwt and async. One of the early considerations was not to restrict ourselves to any of those -- we wanted to support them all.
There were also two distinct basic "platforms" we wanted to target from the
outset: the case of a simple executable, and the case of
So one of the first questions we faced was deciding how to represent interactions with the network in a portable way. This can be done by systematically abstracting out the API boundary which gives access to network operations, but we had a third thing in mind as well: we wanted to exploit the functional nature of OCaml to its fullest extent!
Our various prior experiences with Haskell and Idris convinced us to adopt what is called "purely functional" technique. We believe it to be an approach which first forces the programmer to give principled answers to all the difficult design questions (errors and global data-flow) in advance, and then leads to far cleaner and composable code later on. A purely functional system has all the data paths made completely explicit in the form of function arguments and results. There are no unaccounted-for interactions between components mediated by shared state, and all the activity of the parts of the system is exposed through types since, after all, it's only about computing values from values.
For these reasons, the library is split into two parts: the directory
(and the corresponding findlib package
tls) contains the core TLS logic, and
/lwt (packaged as
contain front-ends that tie the core to
The core library is purely functional. A TLS session is represented by the
Tls.Engine.state, and various functions consume this session
type together with raw bytes (
Cstruct.t -- which is by itself mutable, but
ocaml-tls eschews this) and produce new session values and resulting buffers.
The central entry point is handle_tls, which transforms an input state and a buffer to an output state, a (possibly empty) buffer to send to the communication partner, and an optional buffer of data intended to be received by the application:
type state type ret = [ | `Ok of [ `Ok of state | `Eof | `Alert of alert ] * [ `Response of Cstruct.t ] * [ `Data of Cstruct.t option ] | `Fail of alert * [ `Response of Cstruct.t ] ] val handle_tls : state -> Cstruct.t -> ret
As the signature shows, errors are signalled through the
ret type, which is a polymorphic variant. This
reflects the actual internal structure: all the errors are represented as
values, and operations are composed using an error monad.
Other entry points share the same basic behaviour: they transform the prior state and input bytes into the later state and output bytes.
Here's a rough outline of what happens in
TLS packets consist of a header, which contains the protocol version, length, and content type, and the payload of the given content type. Once inside our main handler, we separate the buffer into TLS records, and process each individually. We first check that the version number is correct, then decrypt, and verify the mac.
Decrypted data is then dispatched to one of four sub-protocol handlers (Handshake, Change Cipher Spec, Alert and Application Data). Each handler can return a new handshake state, outgoing data, application data, the new decryption state or an error (with the outgoing data being an interleaved list of buffers and new encryption states).
The outgoing buffers and the encryption states are traversed to produce the final output to be sent to the communication partner, and the final encryption, decryption and handshake states are combined into a new overall state which is returned to the caller.
Handshake is (by far) the most complex TLS sub-protocol, with an elaborate state machine. Our client and server encode this state as a "flat" sum type, with exactly one incoming message allowed per state. The handlers first parse the handshake packet (which fails in case of malformed or unknown data) and then dispatch it to the handling function. The handshake state is carried around and a fresh one is returned from the handler in case it needs updates. It consists of a protocol version, the handshake state, configuration, renegotiation data, and possibly a handshake fragment.
Logic of both handshake handlers is very localised, and does not mutate any global data structures.
OCaml permits the implementation a module to be exported via a more abstract signature that hides the internal representation details. Our public API for the core library consists of the Tls.Engine and Tls.Config modules.
Tls.Engine contains the basic reactive function
handle_tls, mentioned above,
which processes incoming data and optionally produces a response, together with
several operations that allow one to initiate message transfer like
send_application_data (which processes application-level messages for
send_close_notify (for sending the ending message) and
(which initiates full TLS renegotiation).
The module also contains the only two ways to obtain the initial state:
val client : Config.client -> (state * Cstruct.t) val server : Config.server -> state
That is, one needs a configuration value to create it. The
client emits is the initial Client Hello since in TLS,
the client starts the session.
Tls.Config synthesizes configurations, separately for client and server
endpoints, through the functions
server_exn. They take a
number of parameters that define a TLS session, check them for consistency, and
return the sanitized
config value which can be used to create a
thus, a session. If the check fails, they raise an exception.
The parameters include the pair of a certificate and its private key for the
server, and an
X509.Authenticator.t for the client, both produced by our
ocaml-x509 library and described in a previous article.
This design reflects our attempts to make the API as close to "fire and forget" as we could, given the complexity of TLS: we wanted the library to be relatively straightforward to use, have a minimal API footprint and, above all, fail very early and very loudly when misconfigured.
Clearly, reading and writing network data does change the state of the world.
Having a pure value describing the state of a TLS session is not really useful
once we write something onto the network; it is certainly not the case that we
can use more than one distinct
state to process further data, as only one
value is in sync with the other endpoint at any given time.
Therefore we wrap the core types into stateful structures loosely inspired by
sockets and provide IO operations on those. The structures of
front-ends mirror one another.
In both cases, the structure is pull-based in the sense that no processing is done until the client requires a read, as opposed to a callback-driven design where the client registers a callback and the library starts spinning in a listening loop and invoking it as soon as there is data to be processed. We do this because in an asynchronous context, it is easy to create a callback-driven interface from a demand-driven one, but the opposite is possible only with unbounded buffering of incoming data.
One exception to demand-driven design is the initial session creation: the library will only yield the connection after the first handshake is over, ensuring the invariant that it is impossible to interact with a connection if it hasn't already been fully established.
Mirage interface matches the FLOW
signature (with additional TLS-specific operations). We provide a functor that
needs to be applied to an underlying TCP module, to obtain a TLS transport on
top. For example:
module Server (Stack: STACKV4) (Entropy: ENTROPY) (KV: KV_RO) = struct module TLS = Tls_mirage.Make (Stack.TCPV4) (Entropy) module X509 = Tls_mirage.X509 (KV) (Clock) let accept conf flow = TLS.server_of_tcp_flow conf flow >>= function | `Ok tls -> TLS.read tls >>= function | `Ok buf -> TLS.write tls buf >>= fun () -> TLS.close buf let start stack e kv = TLS.attach_entropy e >>= fun () -> lwt authenticator = X509.authenticator kv `Default in let conf = Tls.Config.server_exn ~authenticator () in Stack.listen_tcpv4 stack 4433 (accept conf) ; Stack.listen stack end
lwt interface has two layers.
Tls_lwt.Unix is loosely based
on read/write operations from
Lwt_unix and provides in-place update of
read, for example, takes a
Cstruct.t to write into and returns the
number of bytes read. The surrounding module,
Tls_lwt, provides a simpler,
Lwt_io-compatible API built on top:
let main host port = Tls_lwt.rng_init () >>= fun () -> lwt authenticator = X509_lwt.authenticator (`Ca_dir nss_trusted_ca_dir) in lwt (ic, oc) = Tls_lwt.connect ~authenticator (host, port) in let req = String.concat "\r\n" [ "GET / HTTP/1.1" ; "Host: " ^ host ; "Connection: close" ; "" ; "" ] in Lwt_io.(write oc req >>= fun () -> read ic >>= print)
Attacks on TLS
TLS the most widely deployed security protocol on the Internet and, at over 15 years, is also showing its age. As such, a flaw is a valuable commodity due to the commercially sensitive nature of data that is encrypted with TLS. Various vulnerabilities on different layers of TLS have been found - heartbleed and others are implementation specific, advancements in cryptanalysis such as collisions of MD5 lead to vulnerabilities, and even others are due to incorrect usage of TLS (truncation attack or BREACH). Finally, some weaknesses are in the protocol itself. Extensive overviews of attacks on TLS are available.
We look at protocol level attacks of TLS and how ocaml-tls implements mitigations against these. TLS 1.2 RFC provides an overview of attacks and mitigations, and we track our progress in covering them. This is slightly out of date as the RFC is roughly six years old and in the meantime more attacks have been published, such as the renegotiation flaw.
Due to the choice of using OCaml, a memory managed programming language, we obstruct entire bug classes, namely temporal and spatial memory safety.
Cryptanalysis and improvement of computational power weaken some ciphers, such as RC4 and 3DES (see issue 8 and issue 10). If we phase these two ciphers out, there wouldn't be any matching ciphersuite left to communicate with some compliant TLS-1.0 implementations, such as Windows XP, that do not support AES.
When the timing characteristics between the common case and the error case are different, this might potentially leak confidential information. Timing is a very prominent side-channel and there are a huge variety of timing attacks on different layers, which are observable by different attackers. Small differences in timing behaviour might initially be exploitable only by a local attacker, but advancements to the attack (e.g. increasing the number of tests) might allow a remote attacker to filter the noise and exploit the different timing behaviour.
Timing of cryptographic primitives
By using a memory managed programming language, we open the attack vector of garbage collector (GC) timing attacks (also mentioned in our nocrypto introduction).
For the time being we suggest to not use the stack on a multi-tenant shared host or on a shared host which malicious users might have access to.
In 1998, Daniel Bleichenbacher discovered a timing flaw in the PKCS1 encoding of the premaster secret: the TLS server failed faster when the padding was wrong than when the decryption failed. Using this timing, an attacker can run an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and find out the plain text of a PKCS1 encrypted message. In TLS, when RSA is used as the key exchange method, this leads to discovery of the premaster secret, which is used to derive the keys for the current session.
The mitigation is to have both padding and decryption failures use the exact same amount of time, thus there should not be any data-dependent branches or different memory access patterns in the code. We implemented this mitigation in Handshake_server.
Padding oracle and CBC timing
Vaudenay discovered a vulnerability involving block ciphers: if an attacker can distinguish between bad mac and bad padding, recovery of the plaintext is possible (within an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack). Another approach using the same issue is to use timing information instead of separate error messages. Further details are described here.
The countermeasure, which we implement here, is to continue
with the mac computation even though the padding is
incorrect. Furthermore, we send the same alert (
independent of whether the padding is malformed or the mac is
An advancement of the CBC timing attack was discovered in 2013, named Lucky 13. Due to the fact that the mac is computed over the plaintext without padding, there is a slight (but measurable) difference in timing between computing the mac of the plaintext and computing the fake mac of the ciphertext. This leaks information. We do not have proper mitigation against Lucky 13 in place yet. You can find further discussion in issue 7 and pull request 49.
Renegotiation not authenticated
In 2009, Marsh Ray published a vulnerability of the TLS protocol which lets an attacker prepend arbitrary data to a session due to unauthenticated renegotiation. The attack exploits the fact that a renegotiation of ciphers and key material is possible within a session, and this renegotiated handshake is not authenticated by the previous handshake. A man in the middle can initiate a session with a server, send some data, and hand over the session to a client. Neither the client nor the server can detect the man in the middle.
A fix for this issue is the secure renegotiation extension, which embeds authenticated data of the previous handshake into the client and server hello messages. Now, if a man in the middle initiates a renegotiation, the server will not complete it due to missing authentication data (the client believes this is the first handshake).
We implement and require the secure renegotiation extension by
default, but it is possible to configure
ocaml-tls to not require
it -- to be able to communicate with servers and
clients which do not support this extension.
Implementation of the mitigation is on the server side in ensure_reneg and on the client side in validate_reneg. The data required for the secure renegotiation is stored in `handshake_state` while sending and receiving Finished messages. You can find further discussion in issue 3.
TLS 1.0 and known-plaintext (BEAST)
TLS 1.0 reuses the last ciphertext block as IV in CBC mode. If an attacker has a (partially) known plaintext, she can find the remaining plaintext. This is known as the BEAST attack and there is a long discussion about mitigations. Our mitigation is to prepend each TLS-1.0 application data fragment with an empty fragment to randomize the IV. We do this exactly here. There is further discussion in issue 2.
Our mitigation is slightly different from the 1/n-1 splitting proposed here: we split every application data frame into a 0 byte and n byte frame, whereas they split into a 1 byte and a n-1 byte frame.
Researchers have exploited this vulnerability in 2011, although it was known since 2006. TLS versions 1.1 and 1.2 use an explicit IV, instead of reusing the last cipher block on the wire.
Compression and information leakage (CRIME)
When using compression on a chosen-plaintext, encrypting this can leak information, known as CRIME. BREACH furthermore exploits application layer compression, such as HTTP compression. We mitigate CRIME by not providing any TLS compression support, while we cannot do anything to mitigate BREACH.
SSL-2.0 is insecure, a man in the middle can downgrade the version to SSL-2.0. The mitigation we implement is that we do not support SSL-2.0, and thus cannot be downgraded. Also, we check that the version of the client hello matches the first two bytes in the premaster secret here. You can find further discussion in issue 5.
A vulnerability including session resumption and renegotiation was discovered by the miTLS team, named triple handshake. Mitigations include disallowing renegotiation, disallowing modification of the certificate during renegotiation, or a hello extension. Since we do not support session resumption yet, we have not yet implemented any of the mentioned mitigations. There is further discussion in issue 9.
A fragment of an alert can be sent by a man in the middle during the initial handshake. If the fragment is not cleared once the handshake is finished, the authentication of alerts is broken. This was discovered in 2012; our mitigation is to discard fragmented alerts.
Within six months, two hackers managed to develop a clean-slate TLS stack, together with required crypto primitives, ASN.1, and X.509 handling, in a high-level pure language. We interoperate with widely deployed TLS stacks, as shown by our demo server. The code size is nearly two orders of magnitude smaller than OpenSSL, the most widely used open source library (written in C, which a lot of programming languages wrap instead of providing their own TLS implementation). Our code base seems to be robust -- the demo server successfully finished over 22500 sessions in less than a week, with only 11 failing traces.
There is a huge need for high quality TLS implementations, because several TLS implementations suffered this year from severe security problems, such as heartbleed, goto fail, session id, Bleichenbacher, change cipher suite and GCM DoS. The main cause is implementation complexity due to lack of abstraction, and memory safety issues.
We still need to address some security issues, and improve our performance. We invite people to do rigorous code audits (both manual and automated) and try testing our code in their services.
Please be aware that this release is a beta and is missing external code audits. It is not yet intended for use in any security critical applications.
Since this is the final post in our series, we would like to thank all people who reported issues so far: Anil Madhavapeddy, Török Edwin, Daniel Bünzli, Andreas Bogk, Gregor Kopf, Graham Steel, Jerome Vouillon, Amir Chaudhry, Ashish Agarwal. Additionally, we want to thank the miTLS team (especially Cedric and Karthikeyan) for fruitful discussions, as well as the OCaml Labs and Mirage teams. And thanks to Peter Sewell and Richard Mortier for funding within the REMS, UCN, and Horizon projects. The software was started in Aftas beach house in Mirleft, Morocco.
Posts in this TLS series: